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TORTS
JOHN W. WADE*
As might have been expected a large portion of the litigation before
the Tennessee appellate courts during the Survey period involved tort
actions. Most of these actions, of course, were based upon negligence.
There were several cases involving the intentional harms of assault
and battery and false imprisonment. No cases were decided involving




In the typical negligence case, the requirement of duty to use due
care does not raise a real issue. If I am driving my automobile down
the street, for example, I unquestionably owe to pedestrians and other
drivers a duty to drive it carefully; the major issue is likely to be on
the question of whether I breached that duty and drove negligently:
On occasion, however, a real question may arise as to whether a duty
to use care exists or as to the nature of that duty. Most of these cases
involve special relationships. Several of them were decided by the
Tennessee courts during the past year.
(1) Manufacturers and Suppliers
Over a hundred years ago the English court rendered the decision
of Winterbottom v. Wright,' the origin of the traditional rule that a
manufacturer or supplier of a chattel is not liable to parties with whom
he is not in privity. It made no difference that the chattel was defec-
tive due to the negligence of the defendant, because he was under no
duty to the third party to use care. This rule was adopted in Ten-
nessee in 1912.2 Dissatisfaction with the rule produced a growing num-
ber of exceptions; and when the New York Court of Appeals, in the
famous case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,3 declared that the ex-
ceptions had become the rule and that a manufacturer was under a
duty to third parties to use care, the new doctrine quickly spread to
other states. The statement has been made that this doctrine has been
adopted in all American jurisdictions,4 but the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee has never officially adopted it.5 No decision during the past year
* Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
2. Burkett v. Studebaker Motor Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 150 S.W. 421 (1912).
3. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, Ann. Cas. 1916C 440 (1916).
4. SiMITH AND PROSSER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 854 (1952).
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involved the liability of manufacturers, but there has been a very
thorough study of the state of the law in Tennessee in regard to prod-
ucts liability.6
Two cases involved the duty owed by a supplier of goods to third
parties. In English v. Stevens,7 W. D. Stevens permitted his brother
Marvin to use a truck tractor (minus the trailer) as a pleasure vehicle
to take his family on a trip. Marvin collided with the plaintiff and
injured her; he did not appeal from a judgment against him. W. D.
Stevens did appeal from the judgment against him, and the Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that he should have had a directed verdict.
-A bailor, the Court said, is not liable for the negligence of his bailee.
It recognized that he may be liable for his own negligence, such as
turning the vehicle over to an incompetent person or supplying a de-
fective vehicle; but it found no evidence thathe had been negligent in
either respect, since Marvin was "an experienced, capable truck
driver" and the vehicle was "in excellent mechanical condition." This
recognition of a "duty of exercising ordinary care to avoid putting forth
a machine with defects calculated to injure persons who come in con-
tact with it"8 sounds perfectly consistent with the MacPherson doctrine
and fully in accord with the present view in the country as a whole.
In Dabbs v. Tennessee Valley Authority,9 the Supreme Court con-
sidered another aspect of the duty owed to third parties by a supplier
- here a supplier of electricity, a commodity rather than a chattel.
The TVA had contracted to supply electricity to a cooperative associa-
tion. The latter's lines had broken and fallen, starting a fire. Plaintiff's
husband came to put out the fire, stepped on a wire and was electro-
cuted. The Supreme Court affirmed the action of the trial court in
sustaining a demurrer to the declaration. It declared that when an elec-
tric company sells to a consumer it is under no duty to inspect wires
which it did not install and does not control; so also when it transmits
electricity to a distributing company. The Court was careful to add,
however, that if the generating company had continued "to send its
deadly current through the defective wiring of the distributing com-
pany.... after knowledge or reasonable opportunity to learn of said
break it is liable for injuries to persons or property caused by this
5. The latest case of importance is Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn.
392, 192 S.W.2d 840, 164 A.L.R. 364 (1946), which held for the defendant be-
cause of the intervening act of a dealer. There is language in this case which
hhs been thought by some to indicate that the Court is ready to adopt the
MacPherson doctrine. Id. at 401, 192 S.W. at 844.
6. Noel, Products Liability in Tennessee, 22 TENN. L. REV. 985 (1953). I
have myself discussed the Tennessee cases in a book review in 22 TENN; L. REV.
444 (1952).
7. 249 S.W.2d 908 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952). See the discussion of this case in
the section on Bailments in the Personal Property and Sales article.
8. Id. at 910. The quotation is based on the earlier Supreme Court case of
Vaughn v. Millington Motor Co., 160 Tenn. 197, 200, 22 S.W.2d 226, 227 (1929).
9. 250 S.W.2d 67 (Tenn. 1952).
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breach of duty."'10 The analogy here to supplying a motor vehicle to a
drunken driver, though not adverted to by the Court, is quite apparent.
In the Dabbs case, the plaintiff sought to use another basis to impose
a legal duty upon the TVA. She alleged that the defendant maintained
a switch upon its own line to cut off an open flow and thus contended
that it had undertaken or assumed the duty. But there was no allega-
tion that TVA had undertaken to maintain the switch for the benefit
of the cooperative or that the cooperative relied upon any undertaking
by the TVA, and the Court regarded this as necessary to impose the
affirmative duty.
(2) Landowners
The landowner's liability to persons coming on his premises is
variable. He does not owe a duty to all of them to use due care to see
that his premises are safe. The familiar classification of business guests
or invitees, licensees or social guests, and trespassers is used to define
the extent of his duty.
Toward business guests he owes the traditional duty to exercise due
care. This was recognized, though not expressly stated, in Harper v.
American Nat. Bank & Trust Co.,'1 where plaintiff, starting down the
steps of a business building, tripped over a metal strip slightly higher
than the linoleum and injured herself. The Supreme Court assumed
that the defendant, as owner of the building and therefore in control
of the stairs and hallways, owed plaintiff the duty to use due care, but
it found as a matter of law that there was no negligence- no breach
of the duty.
In Brooks v. Southeastern Motor Truck Lines, Inc.,12 the Court of
Appeals held expressly that plaintiff fell "into the category of a tres-
passer, to whom the defendant is not liable for simple negligence, that
is, the failure to use ordinary care."13 Plaintiff had stepped into the
rear of a delivery truck to assist the driver in finding a package when
her foot went through a hole in the floor. She had attempted to be
classified as a licensee by showing a custom on the part of herself and
other receiving clerks to enter delivery trucks in this way; but the
Court found no evidence of knowledge on defendant's part of this cus-
tom or of any consent on the part of the driver to the plaintiff's entry.
It therefore affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant. Had plaintiff
been characterized as a licensee, defendant would then have owed a
duty to warn of defects, and plaintiff might have had a case to go to
the jury.
The attractive-nuisance exception to the rule that a landowner is
10. Id. at 69.
11. 193 Tenn. 617, 249 S.W.2d 583 (1952).
12. 252 S.W.2d 128 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
13. Id. at 131.
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not liable to trespassers was mentioned in Vaughn v. City of Alcoa;
14
but it was held to be inapplicable to children in public parks, thus
precluding a means for circumventing municipal tort immunity.15
(3) Carriers and Passengers
In Tennessee a common carrier "is held to the exercise of the highest
degree of care and foresight for the passenger's safety."'16 In the only
case during the Survey period involving a common carrier, a passenger
stepping down from the steps of a train slipped and fell, some indirect
evidence indicating that a banana peel was on the step. In the absence
of evidence to show how the peel had come to be there or how long
it had been there, the Court of Appeals held that a directed verdict was
properly given for the defendant.17 The railroad was not required "to
keep a servant at the steps of every car during all the time they were
receiving and discharging passengers."' 8
In many states, by statute or by judicial decision, an automobile
driver does not owe a gratuitous passenger a duty to use reasonable
care, some lesser standard of care being imposed. But in Tennessee
ordinary care is required in driving the car.9 This was assumed in
several cases during the past year.2 0
Does the same rule apply regarding the condition of the car? In
Lively v. Atchley,21 the Court of Appeals seemed to suggest that it does
not. Thus, it cited a Virginia case as laying down "the general rule that
one invited to ride in an automobile by the owner or driver accepts
the machine of his host as he finds it, subject only to the limitation
that the driver or host must not, by his negligence, contribute to an
injury to the guest."' ' This suggests that the gratuitous automobile
guest is like the licensee on real property, where the owner is liable
only for known latent defects in the condition of the premises but is
usually required to use reasonable care in the conduct of activities. In
the Lively case, a jury verdict for the defendant was affirmed, and the
14. 251 S.W.2d 354 (Tenn. 1952).
15. See, in general, Noel, The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine in Tennessee,
21 TENN. L. REv. 658 (1951).
A landowner is not privileged deliberately to shoot a trespasser whom he
finds on his premises. See Suzore v. Rutherford, 251 S.W.2d 129 (Tenn. App.
W.S. 1952).
16. Knoxville Cab Co., v. Miller, 176 Tenn. 88, 91, 138 S.W.2d 428, 429 (1940);
cf. Memphis St. Ry. v. Cavell, 135 Tenn. 462, 465, 187 S.W. 179, 180 (1916)
("exercise of the 'utmost diligence, skill, and foresight'").
17. Shirley v. Louisville & N.R.R., 251 S.W.2d 440 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1952).
18. Id. at 441.
19. Tennessee Cent. R.R. v. Vanhoy, 143 Tenn. 312, 226 S.W. 225 (1920);
Wilson v. Moudy, 22 Tenn. App. 356, 123 S.W.2d 828 (M.S. 1938).
20. Lively v. Atchley, 256 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952); Logwood v.
Nelson, 250 S.W.2d 582 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952); France v. Newman, 248 S.W.2d
392 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
21. 256 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).




jury may well have found defendant not guilty of ordinary negligence
in failing to discover defective condition of brakes which suddenly
locked. It is not perfectly clear, therefore, that the Court intended to
draw a distinction between the standard of care required in driving
and that imposed regarding the condition of the car.
23
B. Breach of Duty - The Negligence Issue
(1) In General
"To maintain an action for negligence, one must be able to show a duty
owed to him by another, a breach of that duty, and injury from such
breach. Every one owes to every one else the duty of exercising ordinary
care not to injure him either in his person or property. Ordinary care is
that degree of care which a person of reasonable prudence would exercise
under a given state of facts appearing in the evidence in a cause, or in a
state of facts similar thereto. This ordinary care may be positive or nega-
tive; that is, it may consist of what a person of reasonable prudence would
have done under the same or similar circumstances, or of refraining from
doing what he would have refrained from doing under these circumstances.
What a person of reasonable prudence would have done under the same or
similar circumstances must be determined by the jury from their knowl-
edge of mankind, and of how persons of reasonable prudence usually de-
port themselves in relation to their surroundings." 24
This quotation from Chief Justice M. M. Neil, in 1912, provides one of
the aptest and clearest judicial statements of the elements of a negli-
gence case in Tennessee.
Numerous decisions during the past year have held that the second
element - the breach of duty - is to be determined by the jury, who
are given the standard of what a reasonable prudent person would
have done under the same or similar circumstances. There were de-
cisions holding this in regard to defendant's conduct2 5 and plaintiff's
conduct.26 On the other hand, "'when the inference from the facts is
so certain that all reasonable men, in the exercise of a fair and im-
partial judgment, must agree on it,' "27 the issue is treated as a matter
of law to be determined by the court. In two cases, the Court declared
23. Cf. Coppedge v. Blackburn, 15 Tenn. App. 587 (W.S. 1932), in which the
same ambiguity exists.
24. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wade, 127 Tenn. 154, 158, 153 S.W. 1120, 1121,
Ann. Cas. 1914B 1020 (1912).
25. Central Truckaway System, Inc. v. Waltner, 253 S.W.2d 985 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1952) (truck over center of highway); Southern Coach Lines, Inc. v. Ball,
250 S.W.2d 104 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1952) (speed of bus); City Water Co. v.
Butler, 251 S.W.2d 433 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951) (lighting around excavation);
France v. Newman, 248 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951) (speed of car).
26. Act-O-Lane Gas Service Co. v. Hall, 248 S.W.2d 398 (Tenn. App. E.S.
1951) (failure to change heating system). All of the cases in the preceding note
also involved contributory negligence and held that the issue was for the jury.
27. Osborn v. Nashville, 182 Tenn. 197, 204, 185 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1945); cf.
Carey Roofing & Mfg. Co. v. Black, 129 Tenn. 30, 36, 164 S.W. 1183, 1185 (1914).
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as a matter of law both that the defendant was not guilty of negligence
and that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. 8
(2) Standard of Care
Two cases involved injuries to children. In Tidwell v. Kay's of Nash-
ville, Inc.,2 9 defendant gave two ten-year-old boys some small pieces of
dry ice. They put the dry ice in a bottle, placed a cap on it and were
injured when the contents expanded and the bottle exploded. The Su-
preme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court was
wrong in directing a verdict for the defendant. It said: "The law ex-
acts of one who puts a force in motion that he shall control it with a
skill and care proportionate to the danger created.... The dry ice,
according to the proof, was a dangerous product and where defendant
placed this product in the hands of a small child, the resulting injury
was a probability and not a possibility."3 0
In Hadley v. Morris,31 defendant was driving -slowly along the road,
watching a pair of road graders for clearance, when a seven-year-old
boy ran out of the yard on the other side directly in front of him; he
failed to stop in time to avoid hitting the boy. The Court of Appeals held
that the decision of whether the defendant was negligent was one for
the jury and declared that he was "only required to exercise ordinary
care under the circumstances to discover the peril and to strive to
avoid injuring a child or an animal which does run onto the road."32
This method of using the normal standard of care and treating the
plaintiff's infancy as one of the "circumstances" in evaluating defen-
dant's conduct seems more desirable than describing to the jury a spe-
cial standard of care for a person who is dealing with an infant.3
When the infant's own conduct is being evaluated, however, a more
specific standard of care is used. This was also treated in the Hadley
case, where the infant was seven years old. Citing an earlier Court
of Appeals case,34 the Court declared that a child from seven to four-
teen is prima facie not capable of negligence. The evidence in the case
indicated that the child was capable of appreciating the danger in
crossing the highway, and the Court held that this nullified the pre-
sumption and justified a jury verdict for the defendant. It is true
that the Supreme Court has held that a child under seven is presumed
28. Harper v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 193 Tenn. 617, 249 S.W.2d
583 (1952) (plaintiff, descending steps, tripped over metal strip which she saw
slightly protruding over linoleum); King v. Tennessee Cent. R.R., 253 S.W.2d
202 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1952) (car ran into boxcar obstructing road -no evi-
dence that boxcar had been there for unreasonble time).
29. 250 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. 1952).
30. Id. at 77. The Court relied heavily upon New York Eskimo Pie Corp.
v. Rataj, 73 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1934), which reached the same result.
31. 249 S.W.2d 295 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1951).
32. Id. at 298.
33. Cf. Townsley v. Yellow Cab Co., 145 Tenn. 91, 237 S.W. 58 (1922).
34. West v. Southern Ry., 20 Tenn. App. 491, 100 S.W.2d 1004 (E.S. 1936).
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to be incapable of contributory negligence,35 but it does not appear to
have spoken in terms of the presumption in connection with a child
between seven and fourteen. Instead, it has repeatedly declared that
the standard of care for an infant is "that degree of care ordinarily
exercised by one of the same age, discretion, knowledge and experience
under the same or similar circumstances."36 This expression of the
standard for a child seven or above seems much preferable to the
system of relying upon a presumption; 7 and the actual holding of the
Hadley case is not inconsistent with it.
The general standard of care- what a reasonable prudent person
would do under the same or similar circumstances - is occasionally in
particular fact situations reduced to a specific rule of law. Examples
applied in some jurisdictions are the stop-look-and-listen rule applied
to railroad crossings and the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule applied
to automobile speed at night. In the Hadley case, where the little boy
ran out in front of the defendant's car, the trial court instructed that a
pedestrian intending to cross the highway is required to see that the
crossing can be made in safety before going on to the highway and that
failure to do so is negligence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that there is no absolute duty and that "such pedestrian is only bound
to exercise ordinary care for his own safety."38 This is in accord with
the commendable trend away from the use of judicially declared rules
of conduct to the use of the general standard of care.39
(3) Proof of Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur
In Harper v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co.,40 where plaintiff fell
down steps and claimed to have tripped over a metal strip slightly
protruding over the linoleum, the Court found as a matter of law that
defendant was not negligent. It was strongly influenced to this decision
by evidence that the stairs had been in such condition for a period of
about four years and that over 100,000 people had used them without
35. Wells v. McNutt, 136 Tenn. 274, 189 S.W. 365 (1916) (presumption of
incapacity of child of six rebuttable).
36. The quotation is taken from Standridge v. Godsey, 189 Tenn. 522, 533, 226
S.W.2d 277, 282 (1949), where the infant was 17 years old. Similar expres-
sions are found in Southern Ry. v. Whaley, 170 Tenn. 668, 677, 98 S.W.2d 1061,
1064 (1936); Marion County v. Cantrell, 166 Tenn. 358, 362, 61 S.W.2d 477, 479
(1933) (child 12); Townsley v. Yellow Cab Co., 145 Tenn. 91, 95, 237 S.W. 58, 59
(1922) (child 11).
37. Cf. PROSSER, ToRTs 230 (1941).
38. 249 S.W.2d at 301. The Court relied upon the previous holding to this
effect in De Rosset v. Malone, 34 Tenn. App. 451, 239 S.W.2d 366 (W.S. 1950).
39. Cf. PROSSER, TORTS 287 (1941). Further illustration of the trend is seen
in Halfacre v. Hart, 192 Tenn. 342, 241 S.W.2d 421 (1951), 5 VAND. L. Rv.
250 (1952), restricting application of the assured-clear-distance ahead rule.
See, in general, James & Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conduct in
Negligence Trials, 5 VAND. L. REv. 697, 704-09 (1952).
40. 193 Tenn. 617, 249 S.W.2d 583 (1952).
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injury. Presumably, if other persons had tripped over the metal
strip, this would have been evidence of negligence. 41
The only case where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was discussed
last year involved no new principles or applications. In All v. John
Gerber Co.,42 the plaintiff suffered serious burns to her head in obtain-
ing a permanent wave. In operating the machine used, rubber and
cotton pads serve to insulate the scalp from too much heat. The opera-
tor must depend upon the customer to tell when too much heat is
reaching the scalp, and the operator in this case adjusted the machine
whenever the plaintiff asked that it be done. The Court of Appeals
therefore found that "the instrumentality was not under the exclusive
control of defendants" and held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
was inapplicable.43 In addition, it said, even if the doctrine had been
applicable, it would not have excluded either the defense of contribu-
tory negligence as a bar or that of remote contributory negligence in
mitigation of damages. Actually, it is hard to see how the instru-
mentality could have been in the exclusive control of the defendant if
the plaintiff's negligence contributed in any way to the injury; and
most statements of the elements of a res ipsa case include the require-
ment that the plaintiff not be guilty of contributory negligence.44 In
some earlier decisions, the Tennessee courts seem to have been much
too strict in regard to the requirement of exclusive control,45 forgetting
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is really no more than a sanction-
ing of circumstantial evidence; but the decision in the instant case
seems well taken. There was no consideration of the procedural effect
of res ipsa Zoquitur.46
(4) Violation of Statute
Tennessee follows the majority rule that violation of a statute is
negligence per se47 and also applies this rule to municipal ordinances.48
This latter rule was recognized in McCampbell v. Central of Georgia
Ry., 49 but it was explained that proximate contributory negligence
41. Cf. Morris, Proof of Safety History in Negligence Cases, 61 HARV. L. Rv.
205 (1948), reprinted in MoRRIs, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS C. 3 (1952).
42. 252 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
43. The statement was almost dictum, since the plaintiff, appellant, had
won below and was contending that the damages were inadequate. This was
recognized by the Court.
44. E.g., PROSSER, TORTS § 43 (1941).
45. See Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Tennessee, 22 TENN. L. REv. 925, 936-40,
943 (1953).
46. By far the best general treatment of the doctrine is Prosser, Res Ipsa
Loquitur in California, 37 CAIF'. L. Rav. 183 (1949).
47. Wise & Co. v. Morgan, 101 Tenn. 273, 48 S.W. 971, 44 L.R.A. 548 (1898);
Null v. Electric Power Board, 30 Tenn. App. 696, 210 S.W.2d 490 (M.S. 1948).
48. Memphis St. Ry. v. Haynes, 112 Tenn. 712, 81 S.W. 374 (1904); Green v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 32 Tenn. App. 554, 223 S.W.2d 201 (M.S. 1949).
49. 253 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. 1952).
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will bar recovery even though the negligence of the defendant con-
sisted of the violation of an ordinance.
The McCampbell case also involved a problem regarding the viola-
tion of Code section 2628,50 requiring certain precautions on the part
of railroads. Under a unique construction given to this section in its
early days, contributory negligence does not bar recovery but merely
goes in mitigation of damages, 51 and the railroad company which
violates the section is liable whether its violation was the proximate
cause of the injury or not.52 In the McCampbell case, the defendant
railroad had allegedly approached a crossing without blowing a whistle
or bell, and plaintiff's husband had run into the middle of the moving
train. Neither contributory negligence nor lack of proximate cause
was a defense, and the Court resorted to another legal device to hold
for the defendant. It is the usual rule, in Tennessee and elsewhere, that
one not in the class of persons whom the statute was intended to pro-
tect cannot complain of its violation or base a cause of action on it.5
3
It had previously been held that the words "any person, animal, or
other obstruction [which] appears on the road" did not include a
goose,54 an unregistered female dog-5 5-or an employee.56 And, in Mc-
Campbell, the Court held, following prior authority,5 7 that a person
running into the middle of a train is likewise not protected.
Separate counts are filed in Tennessee for each statute alleged to
be violated. The Court of Appeals held in Hadley v. Morris58 that it
is not error to instruct on violation of a statute under a common law
count when the statute is simply declaratory of the common law.
C. Proximate Cause
Like the courts of most other jurisdictions, the Tennessee courts have
failed to adopt any single test for proximate cause and have made
many contradictory statements in the opinions. Decisions range all
the way from those which adopt a strict foreseeability test,5 9 through
50. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2628 (Williams 1934).
51. E.g., Railway Companies v. Foster, 88 Tenn. 671, 13 S.W. 694, 14 S.W.
428 (1890); East Tenn. V. & G.R.R. v. Humphreys, 80 Tenn. 200 (1883).
52. E.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Davis, 104 Tenn. 442, 58 S.W. 296 (1900);
Southern Ry. v. Kuykendall, 186 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1944).
53. Carter v. Redmond, 142 Tenn. 258, 218 S.W. 217 (1920); see PROSSER,
TORTS § 39 (1941).
54. Nashville & K. R.R. v. Davis, 78 S.W. 1050 (Tenn. 1902) ("But the line
must be drawn somewhere, and we are of the opinion that the goose is a
proper bird to draw it at.")
55. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.R.R. v. Ford, 139 Tenn. 291, 202 S.W. 72 (1917).
56. St. Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Finley, 122 Tenn. 127, 118 S.W. 692 (1909).
57. Tennessee Cent. Ry. v. Page, 153 Tenn. 84, 282 S.W. 376 (1925); Southern
Ry. v. Simpson, 149 Tenn. 458, 261 S.W. 677 (1923). These cases involved a dif-
ferent subsection but constituted proper authority for the decision.
58. 249 S.W.2d 295 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1951).
59. E.g., Moody v. Gulf Ref. Co., 142 Tenn. 280, 218 S.W. 817, 8 A.L.R. 1243




discussions of natural and probable consequences60 and the risk con-
cept,61 to those which declare that all that is required is continuous
sequence and that the injury would not have occurred without de-
fendant's negligence.62 There is also disagreement as to whether the
determination is to be made by the jury or by the court.
The courts have failed to draw a distinction between cause in fact
and legal cause. This distinction has been urged by most of the leading
commentators in the field,6 3 and it will help materially in reconciling
the cases. If it is followed, the cases decided during the past year
present no real difficulty.
(1) Cause in Fact
The meaning of cause in fact is apparent from its very name. Thus,
in Act-O-Lane Gas Service Co. v. Hall,64 where plaintiff's wife died
from pneumonia, the problem was whether the propane gas system in-
stalled by defendant caused plaintiff's home to become unusually and
excessively damp, and, if so, whether this dampness caused the wife's
illness and death. The Court of Appeals held that the issue of fact was
one for the jury to determine and affirmed a judgment for plaintiff.
Again, in France v. Newman,65 plaintiff, injured in an automobile
accident, previously suffered from narcolepsy (uncontrollable desire
to sleep for a short time), and the Court of Appeals held that the jury
might determine whether the disease was worse after the accident
and could award damages for the aggravation if it was present.
Cause in fact is sometimes called causa sine qua non- the cause
without which the damage would not have been incurred. This ap-
proach is illustrated by City Water Co. v. Butler.66 In this case, the
defendant had left an excavation in the street at night, and the lighting,
according to jury verdict, was inadequate. But plaintiff, who ran
into the excavation with his motorcycle, had lights which would reflect
only 35 to 40 feet, while the statute required lights reflecting 200 feet;
this made him negligent per se. The Court of Appeals held that it
was for the jury to determine whether plaintiff would have seen the
hole in time to stop or swerve aside if his lights had been as strong
as the statute required.
60. E.g., Chattanooga Light & Power Co. v. Hodges, 109 Tenn. 331, 70 S.W.
616, 60 L.R.A. 459, 97 Am. St. Rep. 844 (1902).
61. E.g., Inter-City Trucking Co. v. Daniels, 181 Tenn. 126, 178 S.W.2d 756
(1944); Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital, 31 Tenn. App. 12, 211 S.W.2d 450 (M.S.
1947.)
62. E.g., Cartwright v. Graves, 182 Tenn. 114, 184 S.W.2d 373 (1944); Postal-
Telegraph Cable Co. v. Zopfi, 93 Tenn. 369, 24 S.W. 633 (1894).
63. See MoRRIs, STUDIEs nw THE LAW OF TORTS C. 7 (1952); PROSSER, TORTS
§§ 46, 48 (1941).
64. 248 S.W.2d 398 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951). This action was apparently for
breach of contract, but the Court treated the causation issue as if it were a tort
action for wrongful death.
65. 248 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
66. 251 S.W.2d 433 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
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These cases all indicate that the jury makes the determination as
to cause in fact, and it is usually said that the issue is for the jury
unless reasonable minds would reach but one conclusion. In the Act-
O-Lane case, the Court said: "While a jury will not be permitted to
choose between two or more equally probable causes, for only one of
which the defendant is responsible, it is sufficient if the cause for which
defendant is responsible is shown to be as in the present case, the most
probable."6 7 This statement is apt to prove misleading unless it is
realized that the jury makes the determination that the cause for
which defendant is responsible is the most probable and that they
should be permitted to reach this conclusion if there is any reasonable
basis for it.68
(2) Legal Cause
Even though cause in fact is found to be present, however, defend-
ant's liability may still be cut off because of lack of legal causation.
All v. John Gerber Co.69 provides an example. A wife had suffered
severe burns to her head from a permanent wave treatment, and her
husband sought to recover for "mental anguish suffered by him as a
result of 'witnessing the results of his wife's painful injury' and mental
anguish to be suffered in the future in being reminded constantly of
his wife's misfortune by the permanent scars." Despite the obvious
presence of cause in fact (if plaintiff suffered mental distress from his
wife's pain and physical condition, it was unquestionably caused by
defendant's negligence), the Court of Appeals held that there could
be no recovery. This decision is in accord with the great weight of
authority.7 0 It can be posed in terms of lack of a duty owed to the
plaintiff, or lack of an interest subject to legal protection or of an
improper element of damages, but it is most generally posed in terms
of proximate cause. In any event, the decision is essentially one of
policy, embodying the view that the liability of a defendant who has
merely been negligent7' would be entirely too broad if it extended to
this type of injury.
The test for cause in fact is a simple one easily transmissable to a
67. 248 S.W.2d at 404.
68. Cf. Nashville Gas & Heating Co. v. Phillips, 17 Tenn. App. 648, 664, 69
S.W.2d 914, 923 (M.S. 1933); Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Harrison, 5 Tenn.
App. 22, 35 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1927).
69. 252 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
70. The leading case in Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497,
98 A.L.R. 394 (1935). To the same effect is Nuckles v. Tennessee Electric
Power Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S.W. 775 (1927). Contra: Rasmussen v. Benson,
133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W. 674, 122 A.L.R. 1468 (1937).
71. In the instant case, plaintiff had cited Stepp v. Black, 14 Tenn. App. 153
(M.S. 1931), as allowing a husband to recover for mental anguish suffered be-
cause of what happened to his wife. But this was an action for criminal con-
versation, an intentional harm involving a direct invasion of the very interest
of the husband's peace of mind; and the Court very properly did not regard
it as in point.
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jury. Thus, in Hadley v. Morris,7 2 the Court declared it appropriate to
instruct in the language of two earlier Supreme Court cases: "The
proximate cause of an injury may, in general, be stated to be 'that act
or omission which immediately causes or fails to prevent the injury;
an act or omission occurring or concurring with another, which, had
not happened, the injury would not have been inflicted .... -"73 But the
"'proximate cause' is not necessarily that which is next or last in time
or place, but that which is a procuring, efficient, and predominant
cause. Closeness in casual relation, rather, is the meaning." 74 This
language is phrased primarily in terms of cause in fact and is adequate
to take care of the great majority of cases.
In the comparatively infrequent case involving a true problem of'
legal cause, this test is not adequate; and there is, indeed, no single
test which will explain all of, the cases. The Hadley case referred to
the language of Judge Felts in Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital:7 5 "The
majority of the well-considered cases, we think, apply foreseeableness
only as a test of negligence: whether defendant's conduct created an
unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff. If it did, such cases hold de-
fendant liable for all injuries within the reasonable range of such
risk, whether they could have been foreseen or not.... So the par-
ticular harm which actually befell Spivey need not have been' fore-
seeable. It is enough that some such harm of a like general character
was reasonably foreseeable as a likely result of defendant's failure to
use due care ... ." This seems as apt an expression of a' single test
as can be found. It will explain most of the cases 76 and is entirely
consistent with the test used for determining whether the violation of
a statute can be the basis of an action by the plaintiff -whether he
and his injury come within the class of persons and the interests which
the statute was intended to protect.
7 7
Should this language be given to the jury? Indeed, is the issue of
legal cause one to go to the jury at all? There are many statements
that the question of proximate cause is one for the jury.7 8 But the
Supreme Court has sometimes said that "where the facts are fairly
incontrovertible the question of proximate or intervening cause is for
72. 249 S.W.2d 295 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1951).
73. Deming v. Merchants' Cotton-Press Co., 90 Tenn. 306, 353, 17 S.W. 89,
99 (1891).
74. Grigsby & Co. v. Bratton, 128 Tenn. 597, 603, 163 S.W. 804, 806 (1913)-
75. 31 Tenn. App. 12, 25, 28, 211 S.W.2d 450, 455, 45.7 (M:S. 1947). •
76. It explains, for example, Tidwell v. Kay's of Nashville,' Inc., 250 S.W.2dc
75 (Tenn. 1952), where the subject of proximate cause was treated somew'hat
obliquely. There defendant gave two small boys some dry ice which they
placed in a bottle; they were injured when the bottle exploded.
77. See McCampbell v. Central of Georgia Ry, 253 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. 1952)
and discussion supra pp. 997-98.
78. During the past year, for example, see Central Truckaway System, In6.
v. Waltner, 253 S.W.2d 985 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952); France v. 'Newman, 249
S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
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the court."7-9 This would apparently place the question of legal cause
in the hands of the court, since it does not depend upon a resolution
of fact issues. At other times, the Court has varied the language to
say that the question is for the court when "the facts are uncon-
troverted and reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion there-
from."80 At any rate, the court frequently decides the issue of legal
cause, particularly if there are crystalized holdings for the type of fact
problem involved.81 If it wishes it can leave the question to the jury,
and the language in the Spivey case seems appropriate.
D. Damages
Several cases discussed the measure of damages to be awarded in
negligence actions. Most of them concerned a contention that the
amount awarded by the jury was excessive. In France v. Newman,8 2
the Court enumerated the factors to be considered in passing on this
contention: ". . it is the duty of the courts to take into consideration
the nature and extent of the injuries, the suffering, expenses, diminu-
tion of earning capacity, inflation and high cost of living, age, expect-
ancy of life and amount awarded in other similar cases."83 Act-O-Lane
Gas Service Co. v. Hal184 and Southern Coach Lines, Inc. v. Ball85 in-
volved the measure of damages in wrongful-death cases.8  The measure
of damages for loss of consortium was discussed in All v. John Gerber
Co. 87
The subject of exemplary damages was considered by the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee in Earley v. Road-
way Express, Inc.88 Judge Taylor explained that under the Tennessee
rule exemplary damages are awarded "where the wrongdoer behaved
79. E.g., Chattanooga Light & Power Co. v. Hodges, 109 Tenn. 331, 341, 70
S.W. 616, 618, 60 L.R.A. 459, 97 Am. St. Rep. 844 (1902).
80. Illinois Central R.R. v. Nichols, 173 Tenn. 602, 617, 118 S.W.2d 213, 218
(1938); see also Moody v. Gulf Ref. Co., 142 Tenn. 280, 290, 218 S.W. 817, 819,
8 A.L.R. 1243 (1920).
81. In the All case, supra note 69, for example, the court simply made the
decision without any thought of submitting the issue to the jury. The majority
of courts would have agreed.
82. 248 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
83. Id. at 396.
84. 248 S.W.2d 398 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
85. 250 S.W.2d 104 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1952).
86. For a thorough and careful study of this topic, see Gamble, Actions for
Wrongful Death in Tennessee, 4 VAND. L. REV. 289 (1951). Reference should
here be made to an act at the last session of the legislature providing that the
wrongful death action in the case of a married woman passes to her surviving
husband. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 210.
87. 252 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952). This case contains a good review
of the authorities on the substantive law of consortium. In this connection,
reference may be made to Napier v. Martin, 250 S.W.2d 35 (Tenn. 1952), sug-
gesting that no action for loss of consortium lies in Tennessee by a wife against
a person who negligently injured her husband. See the discussion of the
All and Napier cases in the section on Actions for Loss of Consortium of the
Domestic Relations article.
88. 106 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. Tenn. 1952).
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so wantonly or grossly as to show a willingness to inflict the injury."89
They are not normally awarded against a master for the acts of his
servant, but a careful examination of the Tennessee cases was found
to show three exceptions to this rule: (1) when the master is under
a duty imposed by contract or law to refrain from mistreatment of the
contractee (e.g., common carrier and passenger); (2) where the nature
of the servant's duty is such that the use of force by him is naturally
contemplated (e.g., guards or watchmen entrusted with weapons);
(3) where a dangerous instrumentality entrusted to the servant is




Proximate contributory negligence of the plaintiff bars recovery in
Tennessee. This was recognized in McCampbell v. Central of Georgia
Ry.,90 where the Supreme Court held also that the plaintiff's declara-
tion may state facts showing his contributory negligence so con-
clusively that a demurrer should have been sustained to the declara-
tion. The Court added that the fact that defendant's negligence con-
sists of violation of a statute or ordinance does not prevent contribu-
tory negligence from being a bar.
Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense and must be
pleaded as such.91 But the Court of Appeals held in Lively v. Atchley 92
that this rule "does not require a defendant to couch his defenses in
legal terminology." An allegation that an automobile guest failed to
warn of danger or protest against the manner of operation was held
to be adequate.
The decision as to whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent
is normally for the jury,93 but it may be so clear that the court de-
cides it as a matter of law.94
(2) Mitigation of Damages
There were no cases during the year discussing the unique Tennessee
doctrine that, while proximate contributory negligence bars recovery,
89. Id. at 959.
90. 253 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. 1952).
91. This was laid down in Creekmore v. Woodard, 192 Tenn. 280, 241 S.W.2d
397 (1951). For comment, see Farrell, Special Pleas in Law Cases in Tennessee,
5 VAND L. REV. 200 (1952).
92. 256 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952).
93. Southern Coach Lines, Inc. v. Ball, 250 S.W.2d 104 (Tenn. App. M.S.
1952); City Water Co. v. Butler, 251 S.W.2d 433 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951); Act-O-
Lane Gas Service Co. v. Hall. 248 S.W.2d 398 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951); France
v. Newman, 248 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
94. Harper v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 193 Tenn. 617, 249 S.W.2d
583 (1952); King v. Tennessee Cent. R.R., 253 S.W.2d 202 (Tenn. App. M.S.
1952).
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remote contributory negligence does not bar recovery but must be
considered by the jury in mitigation of damages. In one case, reference
was made to the doctrine, and the Court said, without more, that it
was properly charged to the jury.95 The doctrine has much of merit
to it, but it badly needs clarification.96 There were no cases involving
application of Code section 2628,97 the railroad statute, which has been
construed to mean that contributory negligence merely mitigates
damages if the railroad has violated the statute.
(3) Last Clear Chance
The doctrine of last clear chance was raised in two cases during the
past year, though it was properly held in both of them not to be ap-
plicable. In Vaughn v. City of Alcoa,98 the Supreme Court held that
it could not be used as a means of circumventing the governmental
tort immunity of a municipality. In Hadley v. Morris,99 the Court
of Appeals held that the doctrine did not apply when a little boy ran
out in front of defendant's car and defendant did not see him in time
to avoid hitting him.
Both cases recognized the existence of the doctrine, and there seems
to be no doubt but that the doctrine has effect in Tennessee, though the
cases in which it has actually been applied are quite rare, despite the
fairly fr6quent judicial discussion. If the plaintiff's danger is seen
and realized by the defendant and he then negligently fails to avoid
the accident, he is held liable. This is the "doctrine of discovered peril,"
recognized by a majority of the jurisdictions and applied in Tennes-
see.100 On the other hand, if the negligence of both parties is con-
95. All v. John Gerber Co., 252 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
96. The historical development of the doctrine is sketched in Note, Remote
Contributory Negligence: A Tennessee Concept, 22 TENN. L. REV. 1030 (1953);
but the writer of the Note expressly abstained from seeking to "define the
correct meaning or proper legal connotation" of the expressions "proximate"
or "remote" as used in this connection. Clearly "remote" has a different mean-
ing from that given it in other states, where remote negligence has no effect
on the cause of action at all. A series of Court of Appeals cases has defined
the "remote" cause as "that which may have happened and yet no injury have
occurred, notwithstanding that no injury could have occurred if it had not
happened." Elmore v. Thompson, 14 Tenn. App. 78, 100 (M.S. 1931). See also
De Rossett v. Malone, 34 Tenn. App. 451, 475, 239 S.W.2d 366, 377 (W.S. 1950);
Tri-State Transit Co. v. Duffey, 27 Tenn. App. 731, 746, 173 S.W.2d 706, 712
(W.S. 1940); Phillips-Buttorff Mfg. Co. v. McAlexander, 15 Tenn. App. 618, 641
(M.S. 1932).
97. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2628 (Williams 1934).
98. 251 S.W.2d 304 (Tenn. 1952). See the discussion on this case in Tort
Liability section of the article on Local Government Law.
99. 249 S.W.2d 295 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1951).
100. The leading case in Tennessee is Todd v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry.,
135 Tenn. 92, 185 S.W. 62, L.R.A. 1916E 555 (1916), where the Court found
the doctrine inapplicable because of plaintiff's gross negligence. See also dis-
cussion in Tennessee Cent. Ry. v. Ledbetter, 159 Tenn. 404, 408-10, 19 S.W.2d
258, 259 (1929); and Southern Ry. v. Whaley, 170 Tenn. 668, 679-82 98 S.W.2d
1061, 1065 (1936), in both of which the doctrine was held not applicable. It
was applied in Short Way Lines v. Thomas, 34 Tenn. App. 641, 241 S.W.2d 875
(E.S. 1951).
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current to the moment of the injury, recovery is not allowed in Ten-
nessee or the great majority of states. A possible exception is the so-
called "humanitarian doctrine," followed in Missouri, and perhaps in
Tennessee, and applied where the defendant is engaged in a hazardous
business, operating a dangerous instrumentality.10 1 For the situation
in between, where the plaintiff has negligently placed himself in a
position of peril but is now helpless and unable to extricate himself
and the defendant negligently fails to discover plaintiff's situation,
other jurisdictions are divided, and there is no ruling in Tennessee.
But the major problem in Tennessee is the relationship of the doc-
trine of last clear chance to the Tennessee doctrine of remote contri-
butory negligence. Last clear chance is usually explained on a causa-
tion basis, and so is remote contributory negligence. It would logically
appear that in Tennessee the plaintiff's recovery should be diminished
according to his negligence even though the last clear chance doctrine
applies, and there is some authority suggesting this.10 2 If this is so,
then the doctrine of last clear chance has no real independent signifi-
cance in Tennessee, being merely a part of the doctrine of remote con-
tributory negligence. But most of the cases in which last clear chance
has been raised have failed to discuss remote contributory negligence
in any way, and the problem probably remains to be settled.
(4) Imputed Negligence
The negligence of the driver of an automobile is not imputed to
his guests in Tennessee.103 This was recognized by implication in sev-
eral cases decided during the Survey period.10 4 If the occupants of the
car are engaged in what is characterized as a joint enterprise, however,
the negligence of one will be imputed to the others. This has been
the position of the Tennessee courts for some time'05 and was recog-
nized in the case of Logwood v. Nelson.10 6 In this case, plaintiff was
traveling with her daughter to take her son's car to him at an army
camp. The daughter was driving, plaintiff being unable to drive;
101. The suggestion that the humanitarian doctrine applies in Tennessee is
made in Todd v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 135 Tenn. 92, 106, 185 S.W. 62, 65,
L.R.A. 1916E 555 (1916). The Court in the instant case of Hadley v. Morris,
249 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1951), indicated that it may be confined to"railroads, electric power companies, etc. operating dangerous instrumentali-
ties," and gives no suggestion that it might apply to an automobile.
102. See Hemmer v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 24 Tenn. App. 42, 53, 139
S.W.2d 698, 705 (M.S. 1940); and see Memphis Street Ry. v. Haynes, 112 Tenn.
712, 735, 81 S.W. 374, 379 (1904), not based expressly on last clear chance but
explained in later cases on this basis.
103. Berryman v. Dilworth, 178 Tenn. 566, 160 S.W.2d 899 (1942); Stem v.
Nashville Interurban Ry., 142 Tenn. 494, 221 S.W. 192 (1920).
104. King v. Tennessee Cent. R.R., 253 S.W.2d 202 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1952);
cf. Lively v. Atchley, 256 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952); France v. Newman,
248 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951).
105. Berryman v. Dilworth, 178 Tenn. 566, 160 S.W.2d 899 (1942); Schwartz
v. Johnson, 152 Tenn. 586, 280 S.W. 32, 47 A.L.R. 323 (1926).
106. 250 S.W.2d 582 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952), 22 TENN. L. REV. 1072 (1953).
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expenses of the trip were being paid by the son. The car skidded going
over an icy bridge and came to a stop on the shoulder; it was then
struck by a car driven by defendant Coffey. Plaintiff brought this
action against her daughter and Coffey. Coffey appealed a verdict
against him, contending that the daughter's negligence was imputed
to plaintiff. The Court found that plaintiff did not have "an equal and
joint right of control in the prosecution of a common enterprise" 10 7 and
quoted a previous statement to the effect that "'the mere fact that
both have engaged in the drive because of the mutual pleasure to be
so desired (derived) does not materially alter the situation.' "108 The
Tennessee courts have taken a commendable position in restricting the
scope of the joint-enterprise defense.10 9
II. INTENTIONAL HARMS
A. Assault and Battery
In two cases, plaintiff was shot by defendant.110 In both, the jury
rendered a verdict for plaintiff involving substantial compensatory
damages and a large sum for punitive damages. The Court of Appeals
sustained both awards. In one case,"' it discussed the subject of puni-
tive damages at some length, indicating the factors on which punitive
damages are awarded and declaring that it is proper to consider the
financial condition of the defendant in assessing them and that no
particular relationship is required between the amount of the actual
damages and the punitive damages.
B. False Imprisonment
There were also two cases involving false imprisonment. Rogers v.
McDaniel"2 raised no difficulties. Defendant, chief of police, had ar-
rested plaintiff, a taxidriver, for parking in the wrong place. Plaintiff
was fined and appealed, being released on filing an appeal bond. De-
fendant then arrested him again and put him in jail. There was a
dispute of fact as to whether the second arrest was for the old offense
or for a new one, and a jury verdict for the plaintiff was sustained.
The case of (Blue) Star Service, Inc., v. McCurdy 1 3 raised some
very important problems and may well be the most significant tort
case decided during the past year. This was an action for "wrongfully
and illegally procuring the arrest of plaintiff by Memphis police of-
107. Id. at 585.
108. Id. at 584.
109. See PROSSER, TORTS § 65 (1941).
110. McDaniel v. Textile Workers Union of America (CIO), 254 S.W.2d 1
(Tenn. App. E.S. 1952); Suzore v. Rutherford, 251 S.W.2d 129 (Tenn. App.
W.S. 1952).
111. Suzore v. Rutherford, 251 S.W.2d 129 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
112. 253 S.W.2d 36 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1952).
113. 251 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952), 22 TENN. L. REV. 1070 (1953).
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ficers." Plaintiff was in arrears in payments on his car with the C.I.T.,
and it seized his car, placing it in storage with the defendant parking
lot. Plaintiff subsequently paid the arrearage to the C.I.T. and received
a receipt and claim check for the car. He then went down and got the
car from the parking lot. His version is that he turned in the check and
paid $1.50 charges to a Negro boy before taking the car. Defendant
claimed to have no record of the claim check or the money and con-
tended that plaintiff did not speak with any of its employees. Finding
the car missing on the following day, defendant's agent, Simmons,
reported it to the police, stating that he did not know whether plaintiff
had come and got the car or not. The police asked Simmons to check.
Simmons called C.I.T. and learned that plaintiff had no telephone and
lived on a rural route. Without inquiring further, he reported back
to the police that he had made the investigation and that the car had
been stolen. On the following day, police picked up the plaintiff
driving the car, arrested him and took him to jail. He was later taken
out to the parking lot, where his innocence was established. An alter-
cation then occurred between him and the police, and they took him
back to jail and kept him there overnight.
A jury verdict for plaintiff for $3500 was reduced by remittitur to
$2500, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Court
declared that it "matters not whether defendant directly order the
arrest, if he set in motion the machinery which proximately caused
the arrest; that is, if the arrest was not the act of the officer or other
person making the arrest on his own volition." 14 It held that the de-
fendant in this case came within the first clause and added that, since
the evidence on this issue was not in dispute, "this was not a jury
question.""15 It cited the Restatement of Torts to the effect that, "if an
act done with the intention of affecting a third person ... imposes a
confinement upon another, the actor is liable... as though it were in-
tended so to affect him";" 6 and then said: "So it matters not whether
defendant intended or not that plaintiff be arrested, because he in-
tended or knew that somebody would be arrested, if found in the car.
Under these circumstances defendant owed the duty of reasonable
care in making a stolen car report.
' u 17
This case has caused me considerable concern. I have found no de-
cision directly in point;118 but if the action is treated as one for false
114. Id. at 143.
115. Ibid.
116. Id. at 142.
117. Ibid.
118. Mouse v. Central Say. & Trust Co., 120 Ohio St. 599, 167 N.E. 868 (1929),
cited and relied upon by the Court, is clearly distinguishable. There de-
fendant bank mistakenly refused payment of plaintiff depositor's check pay-
able to a third party on the ground that there was no account, and the latter
swore out a warrant for the plaintiff and had him arrested and jailed. It was
held error to direct a verdict in favor of the bank on the ground that the bank
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imprisonment, as the Court seems to have treated it, the decision seems
to be inconsistent with the established state of the law. In three
respects the decision seems to me to be questionable.
(1) "The mere giving of information to an officer tending to show
that a crime has been committed is not enough to render the informer
guilty of a resulting false imprisonment by an officer, and this is so
even if the information purports to show that the person later falsely
arrested is the one who committed the alleged crime." This conclusion
is drawn in a very recent, very thorough annotation, entitled "False
Imprisonment: Liability of Private Citizen for False Arrest by Of-
ficer."119 It is sustained by numerous cases, some of which are close
in their facts to the instant one; 12 0 and other authorities agree.121 In
Tennessee it is sustained by the case of Hertzka v. Ellison.122 If the
arrest was not made by the private citizen or in his presence so that
he participated in it, he is not liable unless he "directed,' advised,
countenanced, encouraged, or instigated it."'1 The informer may pos-
sibly be liable if he consciously makes false statements, but if "he
is honest, although unreasonably mistaken," he is not liable; 124 and
the rule of no-liability has been held to apply "even if the informer
acts maliciously and without probable cause."n 5
was not the proximate cause of the arrest, since the probability of the arrest
could have been foreseen. But this action was not for false imprisonment
or malicious prosecution. Instead, it was based on the duty of the bank to
honor the check of the depositor, breach of which gives rise to a cause of
action in either tort or contract. See 5A MIcam, BANKS AND BANKING C. 9, §§
232, 241-44 (1950). The normal damages incurred involve damage to the
credit of the depositor; and the only question raised in the Mouse case was one
of proximate cause, whether the damages for the arrest might also be awarded.
In this connection, it may be of interest to note that the great majority of
courts disagree with the holding in the Mouse case. See comment on the case in
30 COL. L. REV. 126 (1930).
119. Note, 21 A.L.R.2d 643, 694 (1952).
120. See especially Triangle Motors Co. v. Smith, 216 Ky. 479, 287 S.W. 914
(1926) (report by car dealer that car was stolen); Snider v. Wimberley, 357
Mo. 491, 209 S.W.2d 239 (1948) (report of prowler on premises with statement
of belief that plaintiff was prowler); cf. Simpson v. Burton, 328 Mich. 557, 44
N.W.2d 178 (1950) (report of poisoning and identification of plaintiffs).
121. NEWELL, MALIcIOUS PROsECUTIoN, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND THE ABUSE
OF LEGAL PROCESS 211 (1892); PROSSER, TORTS 72 (1941); Harper,. Malicious
Prosecution, False Imprisonment and Defamation, 15 TEXAS L. REV. 157, 165
(1937); Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, 2 VAND. L. REV. 509, 644 (1949).
122. 8 Tenn. App. 667, 674 (M.S. 1928): "One cannot be held liable for a
false imprisonment where he merely informed an officer of circumstances
which had aroused his suspicions, but made no request or suggestion that the
suspected person be arrested, and the officer, of his own volition made an
arrest." The case of Eichengreen v. Louisville & N.R.R., 96 Tenn. 229, 34
S.W. 219, 31 L.R.A. 702 (1896), relied upon in the instant case, was adequately
distinguished in the Hertzka case; the facts there indicated a participation in
the arrest.
123. Snider v. Wimberly, 357 Mo. 491, 209 S.W.2d 239, 241 (1948), citing
22 A .Jun., False Imprisonment § 32 (1939), 35 C.J.S., False Imprisonment §
24 (1943), and numerous cases.
124. Harper, Malicious Prosecution, False Imprisonment and Defamation,
15 TExAs L. REV. 157, 166 (1937).
125. Note, 21 A.L.R.2d 643, 694 (1952).
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(2) False imprisonment has always been regarded as an intentional
tort, not an action based upon negligence or a failure to exercise
reasonable care. The rule quoted from the Restatement of Torts
126
that intent to confine one party constitutes intent to confine another
hardly seems applicable here. This "doctrine of transferred intent"
was taken from the law of assault and battery, where there are actual
cases, and was considered by the editors of the Restatement in connec-
tion with physical boundaries, as the illustrations to the section show.
Should it apply to the cases of instigating an arrest? If I wrongfully
direct an officer to arrest A and he arrests B by mistake, am I liable
for false imprisonment? But perhaps this objection is based primarily
on the circumstance that defendant in the instant case only reported
a stolen car "and did not directly request the arrest of anybody,'
27
and is therefore only another way of expressing the first objection.
(3) If both of the first two objections are unacceptable and de-
fendant is to be treated as having intentionally participated by insti-
gation in the arrest of plaintiff, then he should be liable for false
imprisonment. But he is liable absolutely, and it makes no difference
whether he used reasonable care and had a reasonable belief or not.
The charge of stealing a car is a charge of a felony. An officer may
arrest on reasonable suggestion of a felony; but for a private person
to be privileged to make the arrest or to participate in it, he must
show that a felony has in fact been committed and that he has reason-
able grounds for believing the plaintiff guilty of committing it.128 Here
no felony was committed. The defendant, as a private person, would
therefore be liable even though there were reasonable grounds for
believing that the plaintiff had committed a felony and the arrest was
lawful so far as the officers were concerned. 12
9 Travis v. Bacherig,130
relied upon by the Court in the instant case as a holding on the duty
to exercise care before procuring an arrest, was a case in which a fel-
ony had actually been committed, and the reasonableness of defend-
ant's belief was relevant in determining whether he was privileged to
make the arrest.131
126. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 43 (1934).
127. 251 S.W.2d at 141.
128. See especially Martin v. Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., 27 Tenn. App.
421, 181 S.W.2d 638 (M.S. 1944), which carefully considered and ruled directly
on this point. And see TENN. CODE ANN. § 11541 (Williams 1934); McCaslin
v. McCord, 116 Tenn. 690, 708, 94 S.W. 79, 83 (1906); Harper, Malicious Prose-
cution, False Imprisonment and Defamation, 15 TEXAs L. REv. 157, 179 (1937);
Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, 2 VAND. L. REV. 509, 572-76 (1949).
129. See Harper, Malicious Prosecution, False Imprisonment and Defama-
tion, 15 TEXAS L. REV. 157, 164 (1937).
130. 7 Tenn. App. 638 (M.S. 1928).
131. This is explained by the Court in Martin v. Castner-Knott Dry Goods
Co., 27 Tenn. App. 421, 427, 181 S.W.2d 638, 641 (M.S. 1944). In the Travis case,




If the (Blue) Star case is not to be explained on the traditional basis
for false imprisonment, perhaps it can be justified as an action for
malicious prosecution. In many respects it is more like malicious
prosecution, because the plaintiff made a report to the authorities
and the action was taken by them. In addition, the concept of "proba-
ble cause" in the law of malicious prosecution is not unlike the "duty of
reasonable care in making a stolen car report" required by the Court in
the instant case.132 But there are difficulties here, too. In the first
place, it is generally held that a criminal prosecution must be com-
menced, and this involves at least an indictment or the issuance of
a process for arrest,1M while in this case there was simply an arrest
without a warrant of any kind. In the second place, the necessary
element of, "malice" is almost certainly absent. "Malice need not be
ill will, but may be any motive other than a purpose in good faith to
bring an offender to justice."134 And finally, there seems to be no in-
dication of application of the doctrine of transferred intent to the
tort of malicious prosecution. A stolen car report, not identifying or
pointing to anyone, can hardly be basis in itself for contending that
the defendant has instituted criminal proceedings against the person
arrested.
Unquestionably there is a real hiatus between the two torts of false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution. They protect somewhat simi-
lar interests, and perhaps the common law in regard to the two should
grow and merge and provide more complete protection, making the
law which covers the "gap" partake to some extent of the elements of
both torts. The (Blue) Star case may turn out to be a very significant
one disclosing true growth in the law.135 On the other hand, it may be
132. See PROSSER, TORTS 872 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 662 (1938); F. W.
Woolworth Co. v. Connors, 142 Tenn. 678, 683, 222 S.W. 1053, 1054 (1920).
133. See PROSSER, TORTS 863-64 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 654 (1938);
Harper, Malicious Prosecution, False Imprisonment and Defamation, 15 TEXAS
L. REV. 157, 164 (1937).
134. Thompson v. Schulz, 34 Tenn. App. 488, 494, 240 S.W.2d 252, 255 (M.S.
1949); see PROSSER, TORTS 880-83 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 668 (1938).
135. In considering the scope of the principle involved in the (Blue) Star
case, thought may be given to the following cases. Should the principle allow
recovery under these facts?
(1) P leaves his car at D's parking lot. He returns to find the attendant
busy, puts a coin down on the ticket window ledge, gets into his car and
drives off. A check at the end of the day discloses the car as missing, and D
reports it as stolen. The police arrest P.
(2) D gives an art object to his neighbor P. He absent-mindedly forgets
the gift and, when the object is missing from his home, reports it as stolen. P
is arrested when he seeks to sell it.
(3) D loses his wrist watch on the street. In order to make sure that the
police will assist in finding it, he reports it as stolen. P, an innocent finder, is
arrested with it.
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restricted to its own peculiar facts and not turn out to have any in-
dependent significance.136
136. Reference is here made to tort-related problems discussed in other
articles in the Survey. Cases involving tort immunity were Vaughn v. City
of Alcoa, 251 S.W.2d 304 (Tenn. 1952), commented on in the Tort Liability
section of the Local Government Law article, and Owenby v. Kleyhammer, 250
S.W.2d 37 (Tenn. 1952), discussed in the Parent and Child section of the
Domestic Relations article. Problems regarding the effect of jury consideration
of liability insurance arose in City Water Co. v. Butler, 251 S.W.2d 433 (Tenn.
App. E.S. 1951); Logwood v. Nelson, 250 S.W.2d 582 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952); and
France v. Newman, 248 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1951), all of which are
noted in the Trial section of the Procedure and Evidence article.
